Calvin University

Calvin Digital Commons
University Faculty Publications

University Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1971

Nonstructural determinants of behavior in the replicated
prisoner’s dilemma game
Lawrence A. Messé
Michigan State University

Martin Bolt
Michigan State University

Jack Sawyer
Northwestern University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/calvin_facultypubs
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Messé, Lawrence A.; Bolt, Martin; and Sawyer, Jack, "Nonstructural determinants of behavior in the
replicated prisoner’s dilemma game" (1971). University Faculty Publications. 516.
https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/calvin_facultypubs/516

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Faculty Scholarship at Calvin Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Calvin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dbm9@calvin.edu.

Nonstructural determinants of behavior
in the replicated prisoner's dilemma game*
LAWRENCE A. MESSE and MARTIN BOLTt
Michigan State University, East Lansing" l\1ich. 48823
and
JACK SAWYERtt
Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. 60201
The present research examined three factors that were thought to affect
cooperation in the replicated prisoner's dilemma game: (1) motivation for
participating, (2) understanding of the game, and (3) reward level. Results
indicated that both high-understanding instructions and recruiting Ss to
participate for money (rather than research credit) promoted cooperation, while
reward level had no significant effect. These findings were used to argue that
past studies, which tended to show low levels of cooperation for less than 50
replications, generated results that do not validly model real-life conflict.
It has been argued a number of
times (e.g., Howard, 1966) that when
confronted with a replicated prisoner's
dilemma game (PD), persons should
cooperate and choose their
nondominant alternative. 1 However,
past research has indicated that Ss do
not behave as these models prescribe.
For example, in their review of the
literature, Gallo & l\IcClintock (1965)
conclude : "In general the percentage
of cooperative responses [in the
replicated PD] tends to be weil below
50 percent ... [po 74]."
That detrimental conflict does, in
fact, exist in the replicated PD, though
in theory it should not, was the
starting point for the present research.
We reasoned that since Ss do not
behave as they "should," factors
independent of the basic structure of
the game are responsible for the
typically high level of conflict which is
manifested in the PD. Past research
(e.g., Komorita, 1965; Messe &
Sawyer, 1965) suggested two factors:
motivation and understanding.
Motivation was examined in the
present research through the
manipulation of two variables: the
inducement used to recruit Ss and the
reward level of the matrix. Most PD
studies have used Ss whose primary
purpose for participating in the
experiment was something other than
the money that could be won in the
game; usually they were induced to
participate by the promise of research
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credit that was of be ne fit to them in
their introductory psychology course.
Given this inducement, it is reasonable
to assurne that Ss in these studies were
less than optimally motivated to earn
money. On the other hand, Ss
recruited to participate by the pro mise
of money should be more highly
motivated to behave ra tionally, and
their level of cooperation should be
high.
Reward level has been manipulated
in a number of studies, with mixed
results; for example, Gumpert,
Deutsch, & Epstein (1969) found no
difference in behavior as a function of
differences in real money rewards,
while Gallo, Funk, & Levine (1969)
found greater re ward levels generated
greater cooperation (in a six-choice
nonmatrix form of the game). Still it
seemed reasonable that the greater the
money potentially available in the
game, the more Ss should be
motivated to behave rationally and
cooperate.
Understanding was examined in the
present research through the
manipulation of instructions. Most
past studies have used very brief
instructions that merely po in ted out
the alternatives available to the Ss. It
seems reasonable that Ss would not
completely understand the nature of
the game with just abrief introduction
to it, since payoff matrices should be
totally unfamiliar and, like tables and
quantitative concepts generally , not
easily grasped. Radlow (1965) has
shown that instructions wh ich
emphasized the nonzero-sum nature of
the PD generated greater cooperation
than did a more typically brief form.
In summary, the present research
manipulated three variablesinducement for participating, reward
level, and instructions-that are
independent of the structure of the PD
but hypothesized to affect choice
behavior in the game. If these variables
were found to affect the level of

contlict manifested in the PD, the
results of past studies could be
interpreted as irrelevant to the models
that prescribe cooperation, since these
theories assurne enlightened, motivated
Ss.
SUBJECTS
AND RECRUITMENT
The Ss were 160 male
undergraduates enrolled in
introductory psychology courses at
Michigan State University. In half of
the classes, sign-up sheets informed
potential Ss that one research credit
(the usual inducement) used at
Michigan State) would be awarded for
participation; in the remaining classes,
they stated that no research credit
would be given, but instead, Ss would
be paid for their time.
It should be emphasized that Ss in
both conditions were volunteers; only
the reason for volunteering differed.
Students in introductory courses are
not required to serve as Ss. They earn
extra credit by doing so, but they can
earn the same amount of credit by
performing some alternate task, such
as writing a short paper.
INSTR UCTIONS 2
Two sets of instructions were used.
Half the pairs of Ss were given
instructions that were typical of most
PD experiments: they briefly
described the two alternative choices
available to each Sand the resulting
four cells of the PD matrix. The
remaining pairs of Ss were given more
detailed information. These
instructions first presented the payoffs
available in a nonmatrix decomposed
(Pruitt, 1967) form so that the Ss
could more easily realize the
interdependency inherent in the game.
Then they described the matrix and
suggested, in a neutral manner,
different strategies that might be
adopted in making choices.
Since there was the possibility that
the two sets of instructions differed in
the degree and direction of bias
potentially present in them, apretest
was performed. Two sampies of five Ss
each read one form of the instructions,
and they were asked if they thought
the E was trying to get them to
respond in a certain way and, if so,
how. Results indicated that neither set
of instructions was biased in favor of
cooperation or conflict.
REWARDS
Two sets of matrix values were
used, with one set having payoffs that
were 10 times as great as the other (see
Table 1). Half the pairs of Ss were
presented with one form of the
matrix, the remainder with the other
form.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The manipulation of the three
variables described above provided a 2
(inducement to participate) by 2
Psychon. Sci.. 1971, Vol. 25 (4)

Table 1
High and Low Reward PD Matrices
Player A's
Choices

Player B's Choices
Cooperate

Conflict

Cooperate
Conflict

High Reward Matrix
(in Cents)
50,50
10,70
70, 10
30, 30

Cooperate
Conflict

Low Reward Matrix
(in Cents)
1, 7
5, 5
3, 3
7, 1

Note-The first entry in each cell is the
payoff to Pklyer A.

(instructions) by 2 (levels of reward)
factorial design, with 10 pairs of Ss per
cello
Members of a pair were brought
separately into the experimental room
and seated on opposite sides of a table
which was divided in half by a screen
4 ft high; this screen prevented an S
from seeing the other person. On the
table in front of each person was a pad
of paper with sheets numbered from 1
to 30. The letters "A" and "B"
appeared on each sheet.
The E, who stood at the middle of
the table between the Ss, presented
the appropriate instructions and
answered any questions. Each person
then made his first choice by circling
the appropriate letter on the first sheet
of his pad. After both Ss had chosen,
the sheets of paper were collected, and
each person was given his respective
payoff.
This procedure was followed for 10
trials. When the 10 trials had been run,
persons who were induced to come for
research credit were given, in addition
to the money that they made in the
game, a credit slip. Ss who were
induced to come far money but who
were assigned to the low reward level
conditions were, without prior
notification, given an extra dollar at
the end of the session. Before they
left, Ss were pledged to secrecy.
RESULTS
The percentage of cooperative
choices per pair over the 10 trials was
computed; the means of these
percentages for each condition of the
three variables are presented in
Table 2. Arcsin transformations were
performed on the data to stabalize the
variance, and these scores were
subjected to an ANOVA (df = 1/72).
Further, as Winer (1962, p.208)
suggests, individual comparisons were
performed on the main effects of the
three variables, since hypotheses were
directional (money as an inducement,
high-understanding instructions, and
high reward level were all expected to
generate more cooperation).
Table 2 indicates that two of the
three variables affected the level of
Psychon. Sci., 1971, Vol. 25 (4)

cooperation in the predicted direction,
and the ANOV A revealed both effects
to be significant: money as an
in ducement produced significantly
more cooperation (t = 2.53, p < .01)
than did research credit;
high-understanding instructions
yielded significantly greater
cooperation (t = 1.68, p < .05) than
did the low-understanding
instructions. The results for reward
level were in the opposite direction
from that predicted, but the difference
was not significant (t = -1.48).
Further, no interactions approached
significance (highest F = 0.98).
DISCUSSION
The findings for re ward level, as
with most negative results, are difficult
to interpret. Since the studies that
have examined this variable, including
the present research, have differed on
a number of dimensions, the reasons
for the disparate findings are not
readily apparent. However, for the
most part, the studies that produced
negative results used a simple PD with
a small number of trials « 20). Most
research that has found greater
cooperation with greater reward level
has tended to use more complicated
situations (e.g., the six-choice PD of
Gallo et al, 1969) or more trials (e.g.,
McClintock & McNeel, 1968, ran Ss
for 100 trials). 3 It could be that the
potential for some "easy money" that
was present in the studies using the
more simple procedures generated in
Ss feelings of suspicion about being
aIlowed to keep their rewards and/or
guilt about being inequitably overpaid
(Adams, 1965). Either feeling, if
present, would tend to lower
cooperation. Such an interpretation is,
of course, highly speculative, but it
does account for the disparate results
and, therefore, merits further
investil!ation.
Whatever the reasons why reward
level failed to produce the expected
effect, the fact remains that the results
did support two of the three
hypotheses. These findings confirm
the general proposition that the low
level of cooperation typically found in
the replicated PD is a function of
factors which are independent of the
structure of the game. Most prior
research implicitly assumed that Ss
both understood the nature of the
game and were motivated to play it
weIl (Le., wanted to make as much
money as possible). The present results
seriously caIl into question these
assumptions. The deception of many
PD experiments is that, by producing
conflict, they appear to model those
real-life situations where rational,
motivated persons find cooperation
difficult to attain. But, as the present
research indicates, they model only
the result, not the process; they

Table 2
Mean Percent Cooperation for Conditions
of Inducement to Participate, Instructions,
and Reward Level
Conditions

Percent Co operation

Inducement to Participate
Money
72
Research Credit
55
Instructions
High Understanding
69
Low Understanding
58
Reward Level
High
59
Low
68

produce conflict for the wrong
reasons-for lack of understanding and
motivation.
The question becomes, what are the
factors which deterrnine real-life
conflict? The answer obviously must
await future research, but a number of
va r i ables, such as imperfect
information, asymmetrie power and
threats, and numerous alternative
choices, seem likely candidates. In any
event, it is clear that the typical PD
situation is somewhat too simple to
yield relevant findings and that
answers to questions of real-li fe
conflict must be sought elsewhere.
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